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Abstract 
Evangelical Protestants are less likely than most other Americans to support envi-
ronmental policies and spending to protect the natural environment. We use almost 
three decades of repeated cross-sectional data to examine the factors that promote 
evangelicals’ opposition to environmental spending. Mediation models with boot-
strapped standard errors show that affiliation with the Republican Party, biblical 
literalism, and religious service attendance mediate differences in support for envi-
ronmental spending between evangelical Protestants and other Americans. The im-
portance of these mediating variables, however, varies over time and by the group 
evangelicals are being compared to. Differences in support for environmental spend-
ing between evangelical and mainline Protestants, for example, are primarily due to 
views of the Bible, but not at all to Republican identification. The results shed light 
on the causal effects of religion on views of the environment, temporal changes in 
the social and political implications of religiosity, the persistence of divisive issues 
that support the continued existence of culture wars, and the future of government 
spending on environmental problems in a social context where scientific evidence 
is filtered through political and religious ideology. 
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Introduction 
Environmental issues exploded into national prominence in 1970 (Er-
skine 1972), and have been “one of the most visible and volatile top-
ics of American public policy” since (Andrews 2006:ix). While many 
Americans support environmental policies and spending, Christians, 
and especially Protestants, are relatively unlikely to do so (Greeley 
1993). This comports with White’s seminal argument that Western 
Christian theology is antithetical to environmentalism: “Christian-
ity . . . not only established a dualism of man and nature but also 
insisted that it is God’s will that man exploit nature for his proper 
ends” (1967:1205). Since White’s work, empirical research has both 
established a strong connection between Christianity—particularly 
conservative or evangelical Protestantism1—and views of the natu-
ral environment (e.g., Boyd 1999; Eckberg and Blocker 1996; Smith 
and Leiserowitz 2013), and highlighted diversity and change in West-
ern Christian theological orientations to the environment (Danielsen 
2013; Kearns 1996). 
Evangelical Protestants’ relative lack of support for environmen-
tal public policy has been of special interest, and is likely influenced 
by their religious beliefs, religious participation, and political ori-
entations. Conservative theology (Curry-Roper 1990), religious ser-
vice attendance (Kilburn 2014), and affiliation with the Republican 
Party (Dunlap and McCright 2008; Greeley 1993; McCright and Dun-
lap 2011a; McCright, Xiao, and Dunlap 2014) are each negatively as-
sociated with environmentalism; and evangelical Protestants are rel-
atively likely to attend religious services (Schwadel 2010a), affiliate 
with the Republican Party (Brooks and Manza 2004), and hold con-
servative religious beliefs (Hoffmann and Bartkowski 2008). Indeed, 
several studies suggest that these factors mediate the effect of evan-
gelical Protestant affiliation on environmental attitudes (e.g., Eckberg 
and Blocker 1989; Greeley 1993; Sherkat and Ellison 2007). 
In this article, we expand understanding of the direct and indirect 
effects of evangelical Protestant affiliation on support for environmen-
tal spending in several ways. First, while previous research on medi-
ation generally compares evangelicals to other Americans as a whole 
1 Throughout this article, the term evangelical Protestant is used to refer to conservative Prot-
estants more generally, including fundamentalists and Pentecostals. 
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(e.g., Eckberg and Blocker 1989, 1996; Sherkat and Ellison 2007), we 
compare evangelical Protestants with affiliates of a variety of other 
religious traditions. This allows us to think more broadly about how 
particular aspects of different religious traditions affect environmental 
spending beliefs. There are considerable differences in environmental 
perspectives among non-evangelical religious traditions (Guth et al. 
1995). Separating the religiously unaffiliated from religious affiliates 
is particularly important given the strong connection between apos-
tasy and environmentalism (Clements, Xiao, and McCright 2014). Sec-
ond, the relative impact of political orientation, religious participation, 
and theology remains unclear. Our analysis quantifies these indirect 
effects. Third, numerous temporal changes—such as party polariza-
tion among religious traditions (Brooks and Manza 2004), growth of 
religious nonaffiliation (Schwadel 2010b), and variation in the asso-
ciation between religious affiliations and environmental perspectives 
(Clements, Xiao, and McCright 2014)—suggest that the relevant me-
diating variables differ over time. Consequently, our analysis incor-
porates temporal changes. Fourth, we employ a measure of views of 
environmental spending that adjusts for views of spending in other ar-
eas, thereby accounting for respondents’ views of government spend-
ing more generally (Pampel and Hunter 2012). 
We use repeated cross-sectional survey data from 1984 to 2012 and 
mediation models with bootstrapped standard errors to assess the di-
rect and indirect effects of religious traditions on support for envi-
ronmental spending. Results show that evangelical Protestants’ rel-
atively low likelihood of supporting spending on the environment is 
mediated by all three focal factors: religious beliefs, political party, 
and religious participation. The relative impact of the three media-
tors, however, varies by the religious tradition evangelical Protestants 
are being compared to, and across time periods. Specifically, the di-
rect effects of religious affiliation dissipate in the 21st century. Evan-
gelicals’ relative lack of support for spending on the environment is 
now fully attributable to their conservative theology, disproportion-
ate affiliation with the Republican Party, and, to a lesser extent, high 
levels of church attendance. We conclude by discussing how the find-
ings relate to the causal effects of religion on views of the environ-
ment, temporal changes in the social and political implications of re-
ligiosity, the persistence of divisive issues that support the continued 
existence of culture wars, and the future of government spending on 
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environmental problems in a social context where scientific evidence 
is filtered through political and religious ideology. 
Evangelical Protestants’ Support for Environmental Spending 
Evangelical Protestants’ views of the relationship between humans 
and the natural environment lead them to report relatively low lev-
els of environmental concern and behavior (Boyd 1999; Guth et al. 
1995). For instance, evangelical Protestants are less likely than other 
Americans to practice environmentally conscious behaviors, to express 
a willingness to sacrifice for the environment, to attribute climate 
change to human actions, and to worry about the consequences of cli-
mate change (Eckberg and Blocker 1989; Kilburn 2014). Evangelical 
Protestants are less likely than other Americans to support spending 
to protect and improve the environment (Eckberg and Blocker 1996; 
Greeley 1993; Kanagy, Humphrey, and Firebaugh 1994).  
Following White’s (1967) argument that Western Christian the-
ology is antithetical to environmentalism (cf. Kearns 1996), conser-
vative theology may be a key source of evangelicals’ lack of support 
for environmental policy. Conservative Protestant eschatology pro-
motes a worldview that supports inaction on environmental mat-
ters (Curry-Roper 1990; Eckberg and Blocker 1989; Tarakeshwar et 
al. 2001). Evangelical churches stress God’s sovereignty, which en-
courages apathy toward environmental policies by emphasizing that 
God controls the fate of humans and the Earth (Peifer, Ecklund, and 
Fullerton 2014). The evangelical emphasis on the Book of Genesis, 
with its focus on human dominion over the Earth, promotes low 
levels of environmentalism (White 1967), particularly among those 
who view the Bible as the literal word of God. For instance, biblical 
literalists disproportionately privilege the economy over the envi-
ronment, oppose measures to protect the environment, contest that 
human actions influence climate change, and express low levels of 
concern about the consequences of climate change (Eckberg and 
Blocker 1989; Kilburn 2014). Given the strong association between 
evangelical Protestantism and a literal view of the Bible (Hoffmann 
and Bartkowski 2008), biblical literalism may mediate the associ-
ation between evangelical Protestant affiliation and environmental 
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perspectives (Eckberg and Blocker 1989; Guth et al. 1995; Sherkat 
and Ellison 2007). Thus, 
H1: Views of the Bible mediate differences in support for environ-
mental spending between evangelical Protestants and other 
Americans. 
Frequent religious service attendance is a hallmark of evangelical 
Protestantism (Schwadel 2010a). Church participation is also a consis-
tent predictor of support for environmental inaction, and may there-
fore be partially responsible for evangelicals’ relative lack of support 
for environmental spending (Sherkat and Ellison 2007). For instance, 
religious service attendance is associated with questioning climate 
change (McCright and Dunlap 2011b), contesting that human actions 
impact climate change (McCright and Dunlap 2011a), and lack of con-
cern about the consequences of climate change (Kilburn 2014). Ex-
actly why this empirical association between church attendance and 
religious attitudes exists remains unexplained. It may be that church 
attendance increases exposure to theological messages orthogonal to 
environmental concern (Hand and van Liere 1984), or it may be that 
the social and institutional context of congregations plays a role in-
dependent of theology (Djupe and Hunt 2009). Adjudicating between 
these causal mechanisms is beyond the scope of analyses conducted 
here, but the empirical link is strong. Consequently, 
H2: Religious service attendance mediates differences in support for 
environmental spending between evangelical Protestants and 
other Americans. 
Finally, evangelical Protestants’ connection to the Republican 
Party may lead them to be relatively likely to oppose environmen-
tal policy (Sherkat and Ellison 2007). Evidence of partisan differ-
ences in environmental attitudes in the general public was modest 
at best in the 1970s and 1980s (Guber 2003; van Liere and Dunlap 
1980). Today, however, the partisan divide in environmental opin-
ion is large compared to other social, economic, and foreign pol-
icy topics (Guber 2013). This growing political divide appears to be 
primarily attributable to increased skepticism about environmental 
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issues on the part of Republicans (Dunlap and McCright 2008; Gu-
ber 2013; McCright and Dunlap 2011a; McCright, Xiao, and Dunlap 
2014). The impact of the politicization of environmental issues on 
evangelical Protestants’ attitudes is evident in Peifer, Ecklund, and 
Fullerton’s research in evangelical churches, where they conclude 
that “Southern Baptists [are] unwilling to heed calls for environmen-
tal concern because they are perceived to come from the liberal side 
of the aisle” (2014:389). Seeing the sizeable overlap between reli-
gious, political, and environmental perspectives, Greeley (1993) ar-
gues that the negative association between conservative religiosity 
and environmentalism is solely attributable to political attitudes and 
affiliations. Party affiliation should be particularly important when 
it comes to views of government spending on the environment due 
to the strong association between party choice and support for gov-
ernment intervention and spending more broadly (Klineberg, McK-
eever, and Rothenbach 1998). Hence, 
H3: Political partisanship mediates differences in support for envi-
ronmental spending between evangelical Protestants and other 
Americans. 
Environmental Views in Nonevangelical Religious Traditions 
Mainline Protestants, black Protestants, Catholics, affiliates of other 
religions, and religiously unaffiliated Americans vary considerably 
in their environmental views, in ways not explained neatly by the 
White thesis (Clements, Xiao, and McCright 2014; Greeley 1993; Ke-
arns 1996), their political affiliations (Putnam and Campbell 2010), 
or their religious activities and beliefs (Hoffmann and Bartkowski 
2008; Schwadel 2010a). This suggests that differences in environmen-
tal perspectives between evangelical Protestants and affiliates of each 
of these major religious traditions are motivated by different clusters 
of religious and political factors. The mediating role of political parti-
sanship is an obvious case in point. While evangelical Protestants are 
relatively likely to be Republican, mainline Protestants are also more 
likely than non-Protestants to affiliate with the Republican Party (Put-
nam and Campbell 2010). Conversely, Americans with no religious af-
filiation are particularly unlikely to identify as Republican (Baker and 
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Smith 2009), as are black Protestants (Putnam and Campbell 2010). 
These differences suggest 
H4a: Political partisanship has a particularly large role in mediat-
ing differences in support for environmental spending between 
evangelical Protestants and the unaffiliated. 
H4b: Political partisanship has a particularly large role in mediat-
ing differences in support for environmental spending between 
evangelical Protestants and black Protestants. 
H4c: Political partisanship has little or no role in mediating differ-
ences in support for environmental spending between evangel-
ical and mainline Protestants. 
The mediating roles of religious beliefs and service attendance 
should also vary across religious traditions. While mainline and evan-
gelical Protestants are relatively similar in their political affiliations, 
mainline Protestants attend church less often than affiliates of other 
Christian traditions (Schwadel 2010a). This suggests 
H5: Religious service attendance has a large role in mediating dif-
ferences in support for environmental spending between evan-
gelical and mainline Protestants. 
The unaffiliated are, not surprisingly, far less likely than even 
mainline Protestants to attend religious services (Schwadel 2010a). 
Consequently, 
H6: Religious service attendance should also have a large role in me-
diating differences in support for environmental spending be-
tween evangelical Protestants and the unaffiliated. 
Catholics are less likely than affiliates of other Christian traditions 
to view the Bible as the literal word of God (Hoffmann and Bartkowski 
2008), which suggests 
H7: Views of the Bible have a large role in mediating differences in 
support for environmental spending between evangelical Prot-
estants and Catholics. 
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Changes Over Time 
The associations between religious traditions and views of environ-
mental policy are not likely to be static. Notably, evangelical leaders 
are increasingly expressing interest in environmental issues (Dan-
ielsen 2013), and some prominent evangelical organizations have 
made official pronouncements concerning the need for environmen-
tal protection (e.g., National Association of Evangelicals 2004). De-
spite skepticism, these changes lead many to argue that evangelical 
Protestants have become more environmentally conscious (e.g., Clem-
ents et al. 2014; Danielsen 2013; Fowler 1995; Wilkinson 2012). This 
“greening of Christianity” thesis suggests 
H8: Differences in support for environmental spending between 
evangelical Protestants and other Americans decline over time. 
Evangelical Protestants became considerably more likely to affili-
ate with the Republican Party (Brooks and Manza 2004; Fowler et al. 
2014) at the same time when environmental issues became increas-
ingly partisan. Not only are the unaffiliated on the opposite end of 
the political continuum, but unaffiliated Americans may have become 
more liberal as politicized Christianity led many liberals to disaffiliate 
(Hout and Fischer 2014; Putnam and Campbell 2010). Thus, 
H9: Differences in support for environmental spending between 
evangelical Protestants and the unaffiliated should be increas-
ingly mediated by political partisanship. 
The mediating role of religious participation should also vary over 
time. Catholics have declined in their church attendance more rapidly 
than affiliates of other religious traditions (Schwadel 2010a), which 
suggests 
H10: Differences in support for environmental spending between 
evangelical Protestants and Catholics are increasingly mediated 
by service attendance. 
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Data and Methods 
We use data from the 1984 to 2012 General Social Survey (GSS) to 
examine the direct and indirect effects of religious traditions on 
relative support for environmental spending (RSES). The GSS is a 
repeated cross-sectional survey of samples of noninstitutionalized 
American adults. The GSS has been conducted annually or bienni-
ally since 1972, though key measures included in the analysis were 
not added to the survey until 1984. The survey is generally admin-
istered in person and it was an English-only sample until 2006. The 
response rate ranges between 70 percent and 82 percent, according 
to Response Rate 5 as defined by the American Association for Public 
Opinion Research (2008). After deleting cases without data on the 
focal variables, the sample size is 18,083. Listwise deletion of cases 
with missing data on the control variables reduces the sample size 
to 16,471.2 See Smith, Marsden, and Hout (2013) for more informa-
tion about the GSS.   
Dependent Variable 
The GSS includes a series of questions that begin with the following 
statement: “We are faced with many problems in this country, none of 
which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I’m going to name some 
of these problems, and for each one I’d like you to tell me whether you 
think we’re spending too much money on it, too little money, or about 
the right amount.” Respondents were read a list of problems, which 
includes “improving and protecting the environment.” For each prob-
lem, responses are coded 1 for too much, 2 for about right, and 3 for 
2 For most of the control variables, there are relatively little missing data (35 or fewer cases). 
There are 119 cases missing data on children in the home and 1,463 cases missing data on 
income. Respondents with and without missing data on children in the home are equally 
likely to support environmental spending (mean of relative support for environmental 
spending is 1.21 for both groups), though those with missing data on children in the home 
are less likely to be evangelical Protestant (20 percent vs. 25 percent). Conversely, respon-
dents missing data on income are moderately less supportive of environmental spending 
than are those without missing data on income (means of relative support for environ-
mental spending are 1.18 and 1.21, respectively), though there is no difference in evangel-
ical Protestant affiliation (25 percent for both groups).  
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too little.3 In several years, subsamples of respondents received an al-
ternate version of the spending questions that instead only said “en-
vironment.”4 We combine responses to both versions of the spending 
questions to ensure a large enough sample size.5 The results are sim-
ilar when only using data with the original question wording (see the 
Appendix in the Supporting Information). 
Of course, no single survey item can provide a definitive measure 
of a multidimensional concept such as environmental concern. None-
theless, support for government initiatives on the environment is the 
most commonly assessed aspect of environmental concern, it dem-
onstrates high internal consistency, and it is highly correlated with 
ecological worldview (Guber 1996, 2003; Klineberg, McKeever, and 
Rothenbach 1998; van Liere and Dunlap 1981). Moreover, GSS data 
cover the longest time span of any available set of frequently measured 
trend data on environmental concern, and they “conform closely to 
the pattern found with other available trend data” (Jones and Dun-
lap 1992:30). One potential weakness with this measure is that dif-
ferences between Republicans and Democrats in support for govern-
mental initiatives on the environment “may have at least as much to 
do with their reactions to increased government intervention in gen-
eral as with differences in their concerns about environmental issues 
per se” (Klineberg, McKeever, and Rothenbach 1998:737), which is 
why our measure adjusts for general attitudes toward governmental 
spending as described below. Still, the applicability of our results to 
understanding Americans’ perceptions of the seriousness of environ-
mental problems or their participation in pro-environmental activi-
ties remains an open empirical question. 
3 The nonenvironment problems in the list are space exploration, improving and protecting 
the nation’s health, solving problems in big cities, halting rising crime rates, dealing with 
drug addiction, improving the nation’s education system, improving the condition of Af-
rican Americans, military, armaments, and defense, foreign aid, and welfare. Other items 
were included in fewer years of the GSS, and thus not included in the current analysis. 
4 The nonenvironment spending questions were also reworded into more truncated forms. 
For instance, “space exploration” rather than “space exploration program,” and “health” 
instead of “improving and protecting the nation’s health.” 
5 Previous researchers have also combined the different versions of the spending questions 
(e.g., Dietz, Stern, and Guagnano 1998). Others who only use data with the original word-
ing report no meaningful differences between analyses with the different versions of the 
spending measures (e.g., Pampel and Hunter 2012). 
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As Figure 1a shows, evangelical Protestants are relatively likely 
to say we spend too much or about the right amount on the environ-
ment while the unaffiliated and affiliates of “other religions” are the 
most likely to say we spend too little. These differences in support 
for environmental spending, however, are influenced by variation in 
support for government spending more generally. Specifically, main-
line and evangelical Protestants are relatively opposed to government 
Figure 1. (a) Views of environmental spending and (b) relative support for envi-
ronmental spending by religious tradition. Data from 1984 to 2012 General Social 
Survey; N = 16,471.    
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spending while black Protestants are relatively supportive of govern-
ment spending.6 Differences in views of government spending, while 
of sociological interest, are not the focus of this article. Instead, our 
goal is to explicate variation in support for environmental protection 
across religious traditions. 
To adjust for views of government spending, we follow Pampel 
and Hunter (2012) by creating a ratio for each respondent of his or 
her support for environmental spending to the mean of the respon-
dent’s support for spending on other problems (see list of spending 
questions in Note 3). This measure of RSES is the dependent vari-
able in all analyses (see Table 1 for descriptive statistics for all vari-
ables). RSES scores above 1 indicate that respondents support envi-
ronmental spending more so than government spending in general. 
For instance, a respondent who says we spend too little on the en-
vironment (coded 3) and averaged saying we spend about the right 
amount on other problems (coded 2) has an RSES of 1.5 (3/2). As 
Figure 1b shows, RSES also varies across religious traditions, but in 
notably different ways than the raw measure of support for envi-
ronmental spending. The pro-environment attitudes of affiliates of 
“other religions” and especially black Protestants are reduced when 
using RSES. 
Independent Variables 
The focal independent variables are dummy variables for religious 
traditions: mainline Protestant, black Protestant, Catholic, “other re-
ligion,” and unaffiliated. Evangelical Protestant is the omitted refer-
ence category. We employ Steensland et al.’s (2000) method for cod-
ing denominations into religious traditions. Jewish respondents are 
included in the “other religion” category due to the limited number 
of Jewish respondents. The models include controls for age, sex, race, 
6 The mean of support for nonenvironment spending (see measures listed in Note 3) is 2.11 
for evangelical Protestants, 2.12 for mainline Protestants, 2.30 for black Protestants, 2.14 
for Catholics, 2.16 for affiliates of other religions, and 2.13 for the unaffiliated (p < .001 
for difference between black Protestants and each other tradition, p < .001 for difference 
between evangelical Protestants and black Protestants, Catholics, and affiliates of other 
religions).  
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marital status, children in the home, education, family income, ur-
banity, and region.7 
Table 1. Variable means and standard deviations
 Mean  SD
Relative support for environmental spending  1.213  .311
Religious affiliation
Evangelical Protestant  .253
Mainline Protestant  .186
Black Protestant  .097
Catholic  .265




Religious service attendance  3.798  2.683
Bible literal word of God  .324
Bible inspired word of God  .499
Bible book of fables  .177
Controls
Age  44.932  16.381
Female  .521
African American  .150
Other race  .059
White  .791
Education  13.463  2.943
Family income  10.412  1.001
Married  .507
Children in home  .363
Urban  .224
Suburban  .286
Other urban  .381
Rural  .109
South  .364
Data from 1984 to 2012 General Social Survey; N = 16,471.
7 Age is coded in years of age, centered on the mean. Preliminary models reveal that age-
squared does not have a meaningful effect on RSES, and is therefore not included in the 
models. A dummy variable for female respondents controls for sex. Dummy variables 
for currently married respondent and those with children under the age of 18 living in 
their homes control for household composition. Dummy variables for those living in the 
100 largest Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs) (urban), suburbs of the 100 
largest SMSAs (suburban), and rural areas, with “other urban” areas as the reference 
category, control for urbanity. A dummy variable for respondents in the South Census 
Region controls for regional variation. Years of education and the log of family income 
(in constant [2000] dollars) control for education and income.  
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Mediating Variables 
The mediating variables assess political party, religious service at-
tendance, and views of the Bible. A dummy variable indicates respon-
dents who report being strong or not very strong Republicans. The 
reference category includes independents, strong and not very strong 
Democrats, and affiliates of other parties. Views of the Bible are mea-
sured with dummy variables for those who report that “the Bible is 
the actual word of God and is to be taken literally word for word” and 
those who report that “the Bible is an ancient book of fables, legends, 
history, and moral precepts recorded by men.” The omitted reference 
category is “the Bible is the inspired word of God but not everything 
in it should be taken literally, word for word.” Frequency of religious 
service attendance is a nine-category variable ranging from never to 
several times a week. As Table 2 shows, the means of the mediating 
variables vary considerably across religious traditions. Evangelical 
Protestants are more likely than affiliates of other traditions except 
mainline Protestants to affiliate with the Republican Party. Similarly, 
except for black Protestants, evangelical Protestants have the highest 
rates of biblical literalism and religious service attendance. 
Analytic Strategy 
The most commonly used method of estimating indirect effects is the 
product of coefficients approach (Alwin and Hauser 1975; see review 
Table 2. Means of mediating variables within religious traditions
  Bible Word  Bible Book  Service
 Republican  of God   of Fables  Attendance
Evangelical Protestant  .381  .548  .046  4.634
Mainline Protestant  .388  .229a  .132a  3.764a 
Black Protestant  .055a  .605a  .079a  4.688
Catholic  .270a  .212a  .142a  4.089a
Other religion  .214a  .206a  .335a  3.720a
Unaffiliated  .141a  .100a  .570a  .900a
Data from 1984 to 2012 General Social Survey; N = 16,471.
a. Differs from mean for evangelical Protestant (p ≤ .001).
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by MacKinnon, Fairchild, and Fritz 2007). Other methods, such as 
determining indirect effects from the difference between the total 
and direct effects (Imai, Keele, and Tingly 2010), are not applicable 
in models with multiple mediators (MacKinnon, Fairchild, and Fritz 
2007). The product of coefficients approach requires a series of mod-
els of mediating variables and both full and reduced-form models of 
the dependent variable to estimate the relevant coefficients (see Hayes 
and Preacher 2010). Our analysis, however, is complicated by a mix of 
dichotomous and continuous focal variables. The models thus include 
both OLS and binary logistic regression models. Standardized coeffi-
cients compensate for this variation in type of regression (MacKin-
non and Dwyer 1993). 
The product of coefficients approach to mediation is most often 
paired with the Sobel test (i.e., delta method) to determine stan-
dard errors and thus statistical significance (MacKinnon, Fairchild, 
and Fritz 2007). When there are multiple mediators, however, boot-
strapped standard errors is the preferred method for estimating in-
direct effects (Preacher and Hayes 2008). Bootstrapped standard er-
rors also provide greater statistical power and less rigid assumptions 
about the distribution of standard errors (Bollen and Stine 1990; 
Preacher and Hayes 2004). We employ nonparametric bootstrapped 
standard errors based on resampling the data 5,000 times with re-
placement. To limit the potential for type I error, we use percentile, 
rather than bias corrected, bootstrapped standard errors (Hayes and 
Scharkow 2013). The large sample size and number of times resam-
pling the data should provide reliable estimates of the standard er-
rors of indirect effects (Guan 2003). Given the method of estimating 
standard errors, it is important to note that none of the effects that 
are flagged as statistically significant contain zero in the 95 percent 
confidence interval (confidence intervals not shown). All analyses 
are conducted in Stata 13.8 
8 The “bootstrap” command in Stata does not allow for the use of weights, which means the 
standard errors for the direct and indirect effects are unweighted. For parsimony, the OLS 
results reported in Table 3 as well as the models used to compute the direct and indirect 
betas are also not weighted. Nonetheless, alternative models that are weighted show highly 
similar results (not shown). This should not be surprising as relevant research suggests 
that such weights should have relatively little impact (Johnson and Elliott 1998), particu-
larly since the weight is partially a function of independent variables in the model (Win-
ship and Radbill 1994), such as age and race. 
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Results 
Direct and Indirect Effects 
Results using aggregated 1984 through 2012 GSS data are shown in 
Table 3. The top portion of the table reports results from OLS mod-
els of RSES. Model 1, which includes only religious tradition variables, 
demonstrates that affiliates of all traditions except black Protestant 
have higher rates of RSES than evangelical Protestants, and black 
Protestants have lower rates than evangelicals. This variation in RSES 
across religious traditions partially reflects differences in age, race, 
and education. In particular, the unaffiliated are younger than reli-
gious affiliates,9 black Protestants and affiliates of “other religions” 
are relatively unlikely to be white,10 and evangelical and black Prot-
estants have disproportionately low levels of education.11 Thus, when 
age, race, and education are added to Model 2, differences between 
evangelicals and both the unaffiliated and affiliates of “other religions” 
decline notably, and black Protestants are no longer less likely than 
evangelical Protestants to support environmental spending. 
Model 3 includes all the control variables but no mediating vari-
ables. There is little change in the effects of religious traditions be-
tween Models 2 and 3. In Model 3, mainline Protestant (b = .038), 
Catholic (b = .027), “other religion” (b = .045), and unaffiliated (b = 
.075) have positive effects on RSES. Ceteris paribus, compared to evan-
gelical Protestants, estimated RSES is .12 standard deviations higher 
for mainline Protestants, .09 standard deviations higher for Catholics, 
.15 standard deviations higher for affiliates of “other religions,” and 
almost one-quarter of a standard deviation higher for the unaffiliated. 
9 The average age is 56 for evangelical Protestants, 50 for mainline Protestants, 40 for the 
unaffiliated, and 44 for black Protestants, Catholics, and affiliates of other religions (p < 
.001 for difference between unaffiliated and each other tradition). 
10 Eighty-eight percent of evangelicals, 94 percent of mainline Protestants, 3 percent of black 
Protestants, 86 percent of Catholics, 79 percent of affiliates of other religions, and 83 per-
cent of the unaffiliated are white (p < .001 for difference between black Protestants and 
each other tradition, p < .01 for difference between affiliates of other religions and each 
other tradition). 
11 The mean of education is 12.9 for evangelical Protestants, 14.1 for mainline Protestants, 
12.5 for black Protestants, 13.4 for Catholics, 16.6 for affiliates of other religions, and 14.0 
for the unaffiliated (p < .001 for difference between evangelicals Protestants and each 
other tradition, p < .001 for difference between black Protestants and each other tradition). 
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Table 3. Relative support for environmental spending, 1984–2012                    
 OLS Models Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
 b SE b SE b SE b SE
Intercept 1.184 .005*** 1.237 .014*** 1.063 .028*** 1.116 .029***
Mainline Protestanta .037 .007*** .038 .007*** .038 .007*** .022 .008**
Black Protestanta –.030 .009*** .020 .013 .020 .013 .006 .013
Catholica .034 .007*** .028 .007*** .027 .007*** .007 .007
Other religiona .056 .010*** .046 .010*** .045 .010*** .017 .010
Unaffiliateda .096 .008*** .078 .008*** .075 .009*** .022 .010*
Age   –.003 .000*** –.003 .000*** –.003 .000***
African Americanb   –.061 .010*** –.060 .010*** –.061 .010***
Other raceb   –.032 .010** –.031 .010** –.032 .010**
Education   .005 .001*** .004 .001*** .004 .001***
Female     –.007 .005 –.004 .005
Family income     .008 .003** .009 .003**
Married     –.011 .005 –.003 .005
Children in home     –.012 .006* –.010 .006
Urbanc     .001 .006 –.004 .007
Suburbanc     .004 .006 .003 .006
Ruralc     –.007 .008 –.004 .008
South     .005 .005 .009 .005
Republican       –.060 .006***
Service attendance       –.005 .001***
Bible literal word of Godd       –.034 .006***
Bible book of fablesd       .016 .007*
Standardized Direct and Indirect Effects of Religious Traditions
 Mainline    Other
 Protestanta   Catholica  Religiona  Unaffiliateda
 Beta  SE Beta SE Beta SE Beta SE
Total effect (Model 3) .052 .010*** .046 .010*** .044 .009*** .093 .009***
Direct effect (Model 4) .027 .010** .010 .010 .014 .009 .024 .010*
Total indirect effect .025 .003*** .036 .004*** .030 .003*** .069 .006***
Indirect effects
Republican .002 .001 .011 .002*** .011 .001*** .021 .002***
Service attendance .006 .001*** .003 .001*** .004 .001*** .019 .004***
Bible literal word of Godb .013 .002*** .017 .003*** .009 .002*** .020 .004***
Bible book of fablesb .004 .002* .005 .002* .006 .003* .010 .004*
Data from General Social Survey; N = 16,471.
a. Evangelical Protestant is the omitted reference category.
b. White is the omitted reference category.
c. Other urban is the omitted reference category.
d. Bible inspired word of God is the omitted reference category.
* p ≤ .05 ; ** p ≤ .01 ; *** p ≤ .001 (two-tailed test)
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The control variables show that education and income have positive 
effects on RSES while age, nonwhite, and children in the home have 
negative effects. 
Model 4 includes mediating variables. As expected, Republican 
identification (b = –.060), religious service attendance (b = –.005), 
and biblical literalism (b = –.034) are each strongly and negatively as-
sociated with RSES, and viewing the Bible as a book of fables is posi-
tively associated with RSES (b = .016). Together, these variables fully 
mediate the differences in RSES between evangelical Protestants and 
both Catholics and affiliates of “other religions.” Although partially 
mediated, mainline Protestant (b = .022) and unaffiliated (b = .022) 
continue to have moderate effects on RSES in Model 4. 
The bottom of Table 3 reports standardized total, direct, and indi-
rect effects of religious traditions on RSES. Total effects are derived 
from Model 3 and direct effects are derived from Model 4. Although 
standardized coefficients indicate change in the dependent variable 
associated with a one standard deviation increase in the indepen-
dent variable, interpreting the substantive impact of these standard-
ized direct and indirect effects is complicated by the lack of observed 
variance for the dichotomous mediators (see MacKinnon and Dwyer 
1993). Consequently, we focus on comparing the relative size of the 
standardized effects. 
As the bottom portion of Table 3 shows, all religious traditions 
except black Protestant have positive, significant total effects (black 
Protestant results not shown). These total effects correspond to the 
OLS results in Model 3. The total effect of mainline Protestant is about 
evenly split between direct (beta = .027) and indirect (beta = .025) 
effects; the indirect effect is disproportionately due to biblical liter-
alism (beta = .013). Unaffiliated also has meaningful direct (beta = 
.024) and indirect (beta = .069) effects on RSES, though the indirect 
effect is almost three times the size of the direct effect. Republican 
(beta = .021), service attendance (beta=.019), and biblical literalism 
(beta=.020) each mediate the effect of unaffiliated on RSES to a sim-
ilar degree. Catholic (beta = .036) and “other religion” (beta = .030) 
have significant indirect effects but no meaningful direct effects. 
Republican affiliation does not mediate differences between main-
line and evangelical Protestants, but it mediates a similarly large 
proportion of the (total) effect of Catholic (24 percent), “other reli-
gion” (25 percent), and unaffiliated (23 percent). These findings only 
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partially support H4a, which suggests that Republican mediates much 
of the difference in RSES between evangelicals and the unaffiliated. 
These results, however, strongly support H4c, which proposes that 
Republican affiliation has little role in mediating differences between 
evangelical and mainline Protestants. We believe this finding is likely 
due to relatively similar patterns of partisanship among evangelical 
and mainline Protestants, at least compared to non-Protestants. 
The two views of the Bible measures combined account for 32 per-
cent of the (total) effect of mainline Protestant, 48 percent of the ef-
fect of Catholic, 34 percent of the effect of “other religion,” and 23 per-
cent of the effect of unaffiliated. The relatively large mediating role 
of views of the Bible in differences in RSES between Catholics and 
evangelicals supports H7.We expected that differences in doctrine are 
largely responsible for Catholics’ greater RSES due to the Catholic pro-
pensity to place less authority in the Bible. 
Service attendance accounts for 12 percent of the (total) effect of 
mainline Protestant, 7 percent of the effect of Catholic, 9 percent of the 
effect of “other religion,” and 20 percent of the effect of unaffiliated. 
The large mediating influence of religious service attendance on dif-
ferences between evangelicals and the unaffiliated supports H6; and 
the smaller but still relatively large mediation of the effect of mainline 
Protestant partially supports H5. These finding are likely due to low 
levels of religious participation among mainline Protestants and espe-
cially the unaffiliated. Overall, the results in Table 3 demonstrate that 
much of the difference in RSES between evangelical Protestants and 
other Americans is mediated, but the degree of this mediation varies 
across comparison traditions, as do the relevant mediating variables. 
Changes Over Time 
We divide the sample into three roughly equivalent 9- to 10-year pe-
riods to examine how the direct and indirect effects change over time 
(Table 4). In the first period, 1984–1993, evangelicals’ estimated RSES 
does not differ meaningfully from RSES for Catholics, black Protes-
tants, or affiliates of “other religions.” This is evident in the total ef-
fects, which are only significant for mainline Protestant (beta = .041) 
and unaffiliated (beta = .070). Differences in RSES between evangeli-
cal Protestants and both mainline Protestants and the unaffiliated are 
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Table 4. Period-specific standardized direct and indirect effects of religious traditions on relative support for environmental 
spending
    Mainline  Black       Other  
      Protestanta      Protestanta        Catholica       Religiona    Unaffiliateda
 Beta  SE  Beta  SE  Beta  SE  Beta  SE  Beta  SE
1984–1993 (N = 5,093)
Total effect  .041  .017*  .011  .021  .028  .018  –.007  .016  .070  .016***
Direct effect  .017  .017        .026  .017
Total indirect effect  .024  .005***        .044  .008***
Indirect effects
    Republican  .000  .001        .006  .002*
    Service attendance  .003  .002        .009  .005
    Bible literal word of Godb  .014  .005**        .017  .005***
    Bible book of fablesb  .007  .004        .012  .006
1994–2002 (N = 5,509)
Total effect  .063  .017***  .057  .019**  .062  .017***  .084  .015***  .104  .016***
Direct effect  .036  .017*  .029  .019  .029  .018  .053  .016***  .037  .017*
Total indirect effect  .027  .006***  .029  .006***  .033  .007***  .031  .006***  .067  .010***
Indirect effects
    Republican  .005  .002*  .016  .005**  .015  .003***  .017  .003***  .024  .004***
    Service attendance  .011  .003***  .008  .002***  .006  .002**  .009  .002***  .031  .007***
    Bible literal word of Godb  .012  .004**  .006  .002*  .014  .005**  .007  .003**  .016  .006**
    Bible book of fablesb  –.001  .003  –.001  .003  –.002  .003  –.003  .005  –.004  .007
2004–2012 (N = 5,869)
Total effect  .045  .016**  .011  .019  .054  .018**  .050  .015***  .117  .016***
Direct effect  .018  .016    .011  .017  .012  .015  .024  .018
Total indirect effect  .026  .005***    .043  .006***  .039  .006***  .092  .012***
Indirect effects 
    Republican  .004  .002    .013  .003***  .015  .003***  .034  .005***
    Service attendance  .005  .003*    .004  .002*  .004  .002*  .017  .008*
    Bible literal word of Godb  .011  .003***    .017  .005***  .011  .003***  .024  .007***
    Bible book of fablesb  .006  .003    .008  .004  .009  .004  .017  .009
Data from General Social Survey. Models control for age, sex, race, marital status, children in the home, education, family income, 
urbanity, and region.
a. Evangelical Protestant is the omitted reference category.
b. Bible inspired word of God is the omitted reference category.
* p ≤ .05 ; ** p ≤ .01 ; *** p ≤ .001 (two-tailed test)
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fully mediated. In this first period, mainline Protestant is predomi-
nantly mediated by biblical literalism (beta = .014). Unaffiliated is 
similarly mediated by biblical literalism (beta = .017), and to a lesser 
extent Republican affiliation (beta = .006). 
Unlike the first period, all the religious traditions have meaning-
ful total effects in the second period, 1994–2002. The direct effects of 
both black Protestant and Catholic are not significant, indicating that 
differences between these two groups and evangelicals are fully me-
diated. Republican (beta = .016) is the key mediator for black Protes-
tant, accounting for 28 percent of the total effect. Although there is no 
difference in RSES between evangelical and black Protestants at the 
aggregate (1984–2012), when there is a difference (1994–2002), it is 
substantially mediated by Republican affiliation, which partially sup-
ports H4b. Mainline Protestant (beta = .036), “other religion” (beta 
= .053), and unaffiliated (beta = .037) have meaningful direct effects 
on RSES in 1994–2002. Nonetheless, much of the total effect of each 
of these traditions is mediated: 43 percent of the mainline Protestant 
effect, 37 percent of the “other religion” effect, and 65 percent of the 
unaffiliated effect. In contrast to the first period, the effect of mainline 
Protestant is partially mediated by service attendance (beta = .011) 
in 1994–2002. Also unlike the first period, biblical literalism (beta = 
.016) plays a smaller role than both Republican (beta = .024) and ser-
vice attendance (beta = .031) in mediating the effect of unaffiliated. 
In the final period, 2004–2012, each religious tradition except black 
Protestant has a meaningful total effect, though none of them have 
meaningful direct effects. The Catholic effect is again disproportion-
ately mediated by biblical literalism (beta = .017) and Republican (beta 
= .013). Thus, in contrast to H10, there is no evidence that service at-
tendance became a more meaningful mediator of differences in RSES 
between evangelicals and Catholics. Unlike the previous time peri-
ods, Republican (beta = .034) is the largest mediator of differences in 
RSES between evangelicals and the unaffiliated in the final period. Re-
publican affiliation mediates 9 percent of the (total) effect of unaffili-
ated in 1983–1993, 23 percent in 1994–2002, and 29 percent in 2004–
2012. This growth in the mediating influence of Republican supports 
H9. Interestingly, Republican also became a more important mediator 
of differences between evangelicals and affiliates of “other religions,” 
mediating 20 percent of the total effect in 1994–2002 and 30 percent 
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in 2004–2012. Overall, the results in Table 4 indicate growth in dis-
parities in RSES between evangelical Protestants and other Americans 
from the first to the second period, and a decline in nonmediated dif-
ferences (i.e., direct effects) from the second to the third time period. 
Discussion 
It has been 50 years since White (1967) published his influential ar-
gument that Western theology promotes an anthropocentric world-
view that is opposed to environmentalism. The White thesis is often 
applied in an overly broad manner. It has been properly critiqued for 
failing to account for the evolving place of nature in theology, as well 
as the diversity of denominational interpretations of biblical passages 
including those that promote a stewardship perspective (Kearns 1996). 
Our findings show that biblical literalism has a robust, negative ef-
fect on RSES. In support of H1, biblical literalism also mediates much 
of the difference in RSES between evangelical Protestants and other 
Americans. These results are in accord with the more limited empir-
ical assertion that conservative Protestants and biblical literalists are 
relatively unlikely to support behaviors aimed at improving and pro-
tecting the natural environment, which has been widely supported by 
empirical research (e.g., Boyd 1999; Eckberg and Blocker 1996; Smith 
and Leiserowitz 2013).While other mediating factors are important, 
evangelical Protestants’ views of the natural environment appear to 
be disproportionately influenced by their theological perspectives. 
Although White’s (1967) work portrays biblical teachings as the 
fundamental cause of evangelicals’ lack of support for environmen-
tal protection, the above results show that political partisanship also 
plays a large role. This finding supports H3. There is substantial po-
litical party polarization in environmental perspectives (McCright and 
Dunlap 2011a; McCright, Xiao, and Dunlap 2014). Religious affiliation 
has similarly become a polarized identity, with evangelical Protestants 
constituting a core constituency of the Republican Party (Brooks and 
Manza 2004; Fowler et al. 2014). Consequently, there is now consid-
erable overlap between evangelical Protestantism, affiliation with the 
Republican Party, and low levels of environmentalism. Republican af-
filiation, however, is far from the only relevant mediator, as some re-
searchers argue (e.g., Greeley 1993). Despite the confluence between 
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evangelical Protestantism and the Republican Party, theology appears 
to be more important than politics in promoting low levels of environ-
mentalism in the evangelical Protestant community. 
While playing a considerably smaller role than theology and pol-
itics, religious service attendance also mediates the association be-
tween evangelical Protestantism and RSES, especially differences be-
tween evangelicals and the unaffiliated. This partially supports H2, 
and aligns with research that suggests that evangelicals’ theological 
views of mastery over nature are reinforced by church attendance 
(Hand and van Liere 1984). This finding also reflects the social nature 
of religion and the reinforcement of social and political, rather than 
theological, cues from clergy and churchgoers within the congrega-
tional context (Djupe and Gilbert 2003; Wald, Owen, and Hill 1988). 
The above results suggest that evangelical Protestants’ views of en-
vironmentalism are impacted, though only moderately, by their high 
frequency of church attendance. 
Finally, the results in this article shed light on temporal changes 
in the association between evangelical Protestant affiliation and sup-
port for environmental spending. They suggest that differences in en-
vironmentalism between evangelicals and non-Christians are increas-
ingly motivated by political partisanship. More broadly speaking, the 
results provide mixed support for the “greening of Christianity” the-
sis (Clements, Xiao, and McCright 2014; Danielsen 2013; Fowler 1995; 
Wilkinson 2012), which proposes that differences in environmental-
ism between evangelicals and other Americans decline over time (H8). 
On the one hand, differences in RSES between evangelicals and other 
Americans increased considerably between 1984–1993 and 1994–2002, 
and remained robust in 2004–2012. This clearly does not support 
the greening thesis. On the other hand, differences in RSES between 
evangelicals and other Americans are fully mediated in 2004–2012. 
In other words, the direct effects of religious tradition did in fact de-
cline. Thus, how one interprets the greening of Christianity thesis af-
fects whether it receives support. Evangelical Protestants continue to 
be less likely than other Americans to support environmental spend-
ing, but this difference is now fully attributable to (in order of mag-
nitude) theology, political party, and religious participation. 
As with all quantitative analyses based on cross-sectional data, cau-
sality is a primary concern. The model we proposed assumes that reli-
gious affiliation affects views of the environment, not vice versa. It is 
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possible, however, that people switch religious affiliations in response 
to their environmental perspectives. Relatedly, although social scien-
tists traditionally model religion as a predictor of political orientation, 
recent research suggests that political affiliations can also affect reli-
gious affiliations (e.g., Hout and Fischer 2014; Putnam and Campbell 
2010). While not definitive, we can partially address the issue of cau-
sality with retrospective measures of religious affiliation at 16 years 
of age.12 Appendix B reports results from mediation models like those 
in Table 3 but with an additional dummy variable for switching to 
an evangelical denomination. Comparing the results, the substantive 
conclusions are unchanged. Moreover, there are no meaningful dif-
ferences in support for environmental spending between those who 
switched to an evangelical denomination and those who were evan-
gelical Protestant at both age 16 and at the time of the survey. 
Generalizability of the above results is limited by the measure of 
views of the environment. Support for environmental spending is both 
a common measure in the extant literature (maximizing comparability 
with other research) and tracks well with a variety of other measures 
of support for government initiatives on the environment (Jones and 
Dunlap 1992; van Liere and Dunlap 1981). Nonetheless, views of gov-
ernment spending are politically divisive (Rudolph and Evans 2005). 
Given the known strong effects of political affiliation on questions 
focused on environmental spending, we follow Pampel and Hunter 
(2012) in adopting the relative RSES measure employed here. By nor-
malizing scores, the RSES measure accounts for generic tendencies 
people hold that are specific to governmental spending, and seeks to 
better isolate the explanation of environmental public opinion specif-
ically. Thus, political effects in models we show are attributable to the 
politicization of environmental issues, not general shifts in the stance 
of respondents toward government spending. We would expect polit-
ical effects to be even stronger in models looking at an absolute envi-
ronmental spending dependent measure, and the results in Appendix 
12 We divided evangelical Protestant respondents into those who were affiliated with an evan-
gelical denomination at age 16 and at the time of the survey (18.6 percent of respondents 
and 73.3 percent of evangelicals) and those were affiliated with an evangelical denomina-
tion at the time of the survey but not at age 16 (6.8 percent of respondents and 26.7 per-
cent of evangelicals). We refer to the latter category as those who switched to evangelical 
Protestant. It is important to note that we have no knowledge of respondents’ religious 
affiliations between 16 years of age and the time of the survey.  
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C suggest this is the case. Political party plays a larger mediating role 
when overall support for government spending is not taken to account, 
which comports with Republicans’ skepticism for government spend-
ing more generally (Rudolph and Evans 2005). This finding supports 
the use of a measure of relative support of environmental spending 
to avoid conflating views of the environment with views of govern-
ment. At the same time, exactly how applicable our results are to al-
ternative dimensions of environmental attitudes, such as perceived 
environmental threats, remains unknown. Moreover, the relationship 
between attitudinal disposition and engagement in a variety of proen-
vironmental behaviors (e.g., recycling, participation in environmen-
tal organizations, energy conservation, and purchasing behavior) is 
complex and often tenuous (Kollmuss and Agyeman 2002; Tarrant and 
Cordell 1997). Future research can build on the analyses in this arti-
cle with additional measures of environmental concern and activity. 
Adoption of the RSES measure does produce one finding that does 
not comport with previous research (or, indeed, the results we receive 
when using an unadjusted support for spending measure). Our finding 
that black Protestants are the closest comparison group to evangelical 
Protestants in terms of RSES stands out as both interesting and easily 
misinterpreted. This does not mean that black Protestants are unsup-
portive of the environment. Black Protestants as a group report mod-
estly high levels of absolute support for environmental spending and 
would show up as supportive of environmental policy in traditional 
polling (see Appendix C).13 When the dependent variable accounts for 
views of spending more generally, however, these differences cease 
to exist. Black Protestants as a group stand out because they are com-
paratively supportive of environmental spending in absolute terms, 
but more like evangelicals in their tepid support for spending on the 
environment relative to other national issues. In our view, this sug-
gests that the initial impression of moderately high support displayed 
by black Protestants for environmental spending is spurious to their 
greater approval of government spending generally (Rudolph and Ev-
ans 2005; also see Note 6). Given the similarities in theology and re-
ligious behavior between evangelicals and black Protestants (Lincoln 
13 Note, more generally, that our measure of relative support for environmental spending is 
above 1 for each religious tradition. Environmentalism enjoys broad support relative to 
many other categories of governmental spending.   
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and Mamiya 1990), their similar perspectives on support for the en-
vironment makes some sense. 
The results are also limited by our measure of religious affilia-
tion. Despite considerable overlap between those who are affiliated 
with evangelical Protestant denominations and those who self-iden-
tify as evangelical, there are notable differences (Hackett and Lind-
say 2008). Moreover, the conservative Protestant community is not 
homogeneous. Subpopulations of conservative Protestants—evangel-
icals, fundamentalists, and Pentecostals—often have different social 
and political perspectives (Garneau and Schwadel 2013). Even within 
specific denominations, environmental perspectives may vary across 
congregations (Djupe and Hunt 2009). 
In addition to alternative measures of religious affiliation, future 
research can expand on the analyses in this article with more de-
tailed measures of theology. As noted above, although biblical literal-
ism is a widely used measure of conservative theology, it may be act-
ing as a proxy for more specific theological perspectives. For instance, 
Wolkomir et al. (1997) suggest that the association between biblical 
literalism and environmental concern reflects the literalist view that 
humans have dominion over nature, and Barker and Bearce (2013) ar-
gue that belief in the “Second Coming” of Jesus Christ is the proximate 
cause of evangelicals’ relatively low levels of support for government 
action on global warming. There are also theological arguments that 
support environmentalism (Danielsen 2013) and specifically spend-
ing on the environment (McCammack 2007). In the larger evangelical 
community, those who adhere to such theologies, particularly those 
from younger generations (Smith and Johnson 2010), may indeed pro-
vide support to the greening of Christianity thesis. Ultimately, a mul-
tidimensional approach that incorporates a variety of theological per-
spectives as well as measures of values and goals broadly speaking 
(Larson 2010) is likely required. 
Conclusions 
Evangelical Protestants are, as expected, particularly unlikely to sup-
port spending to protect and improve the natural environment. This 
resistance to environmental policy appears to be largely motivated by 
politics and theology, which suggests that the American populace is 
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highly polarized by a combination of religious tradition, religious be-
lief, political partisanship, and environmental perspectives. Evangeli-
cal Protestants and unaffiliated Americans represent opposite ends of 
the continuum on environmental views, religious beliefs, and politi-
cal affiliations. Not inconsequentially, these are now two of the three 
largest religious traditions in the United States (Putnam and Camp-
bell 2010). Large numbers of Americans staked to opposing perspec-
tives on a constellation of issues is indicative of Hunter’s (1991) work 
on culture wars, where he argued that elites seek to mobilize constit-
uencies through divisive social issues. While Hunter focused on is-
sues related to sex and gender, environmental protection is also an 
important element of contemporary culture wars; and one that is ev-
ident in the general population, not only among elite political actors 
(Evans 2003). 
As the culture war thesis suggests, evangelical Protestants’ envi-
ronmental perspectives may reflect not just theological differences but 
also political and social cues from religious leaders and fellow con-
gregants (Djupe and Gilbert 2003). Although some evangelical elites 
support environmentalism—for instance, those leading the evangeli-
cal environmental network that connects a pro-life perspective with 
environmentalism—many prominent evangelical leaders vocally op-
pose environmental policy (Danielsen 2013; McCammack 2007). These 
cues regarding environmentalism can be highly influential, particu-
larly when they incorporate religious explanations (Djupe and Gwi-
asda 2010). Such religious explanations for opposing environmental-
ism are reinforced by a literal view of the Bible, which can support 
a mastery-over-nature perspective (Schultz, Zelezny, and Dalrymple 
2000) that is antithetical to an ecological worldview (Dunlap et al. 
2000). Thus, not surprisingly, our results suggest that biblical liter-
alism is the foremost cause of evangelicals’ views of environmental 
spending. In addition to biblical literalism, other core evangelical be-
liefs, such as premillennial dispensationalism, support inaction on 
environmental problems (Curry-Roper 1990). A major challenge for 
evangelical reformers seeking to green their religion will be framing 
pro-environmental policies in ways that align with evangelical and 
fundamentalist religious beliefs. Increased political polarization on 
environmental issues and party sorting along religious lines promise 
to considerably complicate this task.  
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Supporting Information / Appendix. Additional Analysis  (follows)
Contents:
Table A1: Standardized direct and indirect effects of religious traditions on rel-
ative support for environmental spending without data using alternate question 
wording,a 1984–2012. 
Table A2: Standardized direct and indirect effects of religious traditions on 
relative support for environmental spending with switching to evangelical 
Protestant,a,b 1984–2012. 
Table A3: Standardized direct and indirect effects of religious traditions on sup-
port for environmental spending,a 1984–2012. 
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